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DISTRIBUTION AND THE SHERMAN
ACT-THE EFFECTS OF GENERAL
MOTORS, SCHWINN AND SEALY
LARRY L. WILLIAMS*
W HEN the Department of Justice recently took three distribu-
tion cases to the Supreme Court, it obviously hoped to broaden
and clarify existing law as applied to the distributive process-White
Motor Co.' having failed to be a good vehicle. Now that General
Motors Corp.,2 Sealy, Inc.,s and Arnold, Schwinn & Co.4 have been
decided it may be useful to examine these three cases to determine to
what extent they have altered traditional antitrust law.
GENERAL MOTORS CORP.
In General Motors Corp.5 the government sought to outlaw an
alleged agreement between General Motors and its Chevrolet dealers
in the Los Angeles area whereby the dealers were forbidden from
selling cars through discount houses. The charge was that the
Chevrolet dealers in the area had conspired among themselves and
with General Motors to suppress such sales in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act.6 The trial court held that General Motors had
a legal right under the "location clause" in its "Dealer Selling Agree-
ments"-which restricts the dealer to a place of business approved by
General Motors-to bar Chevrolet dealers from selling through dis-
count houses.7 Judge Carr found that General Motors had merely
enforced that contract right by unilateral action-without conspiring
with the defendant dealer associations, and that the "location clause"
was reasonably necessary to the preservation of General Motors'
franchised-dealer system.8
* B.S., 1943, LL.B., 1948, Wake Forest College; Member, District of Columbia Bar.
'White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
2United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
8 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 87 Sup. Ct. 1847 (1967).
,'United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1856 (1967).
5 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
6 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
7 United States v. General Motors Corp., 234 F. Supp. 85, 88-89 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
8 Ibid.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court the government was not satisfied
to rest its case on a conspiracy theory but sought to have the court
declare the "location clause" illegal.9 It was this attack that raised
a new legal issue which could have had a significant impact on the
automobile industry's method of doing business (all four automobile
manufacturers use the location clause in their dealer contracts) and
for franchising operations in general. The case, however, was de-
cided as a "classic conspiracy" without regard to the "location clause"
of the dealer contracts.10 Writing for a unanimous Court, Mr.
Justice Fortas pointed to findings (1) that the dealer associations had
initiated a letter writing campaign among their members to get
General Motors to come to their aid against discount-house sales
utilized by some of their members; (2) that General Motors per-
sonnel subsequently had discussed the matter with individual Los
Angeles area dealers and elicited from each a promise not to do
business with discounters; (3) that the associations had attempted to
police compliance with those promises; and (4) that these col-
lective efforts had induced several dealers to repurchase cars they
had sold through discounters and to promise to refrain from further
sales to them." On such findings, Mr. Justice Fortas saw "a classic
conspiracy in restraint of trade: joint, collaborative action by dealers,
the appellee associations, and General Motors to eliminate a class of
competitors by terminating business dealings between them and a
minority of Chevrolet dealers and to deprive franchised dealers of
their freedom to deal through discounters if they so choose." 1a He
concluded that: "Elimination, by joint collaborative action, of dis-
counters from access to the market is a per se violation of the
Act."'18 As a result no new Sherman Act law was developed, and
the franchising industries were left where they were before the case
was decided.' 4 However, the facts of General Motors Corp. and
those in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.15 are such that a manu-
o 384 U.S. at 139.0 Id. at 140. Mr. Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion called attention to the
absence of anything in the majority opinion to prevent General Motors from en-
forcing the sales-location clause by unilateral action. Id. at 149.
I'l Id. at 14041.
12 Id. at 140.
18Id. at 145.
1, See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
1362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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facturer must be extremely circumspect in its actions if they are to
be construed as truly unilateral.
ARNOLD, SCHWINN 9C CO.
What the government tried and failed to obtain in White Motor
Co.16 and General Motors Corp.'7 it acquired in Arnold, Schwinn
& Co.' without trying. In Arnold, Schwinn & Co., the government
sought a rule of reason decision but instead the Court held that
once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted
with dominion over the product, and his efforts thereafter to re-
strict territory or persons to whom the product may be transferred
-whether by explicit agreement or by silent confirmation or under-
standing with his vendee-is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act.19
By so holding the majority of the Court, in the words of Mr. Justice
Stewart "reaches out to adopt a potent per se rule" justified by "no
previous antitrust decision of this Court. Instead, it completely
repudiates the only case in point, White Motor."20  While the
Supreme Court had previously condemned as violative of the Sher-
man Act a manufacturer's requirement that his wholesalers sell
only to retailers who hold licenses from the manufacturer, these
restrictive distribution practices were ancillary to a price-fixing
scheme and no determination had previously been made that they
would be invalid independent of such a scheme.2 1
It is, of course, too early to tell what the impact will be of the per
se invalidation of the determination by a manufacturer of persons
to whom and places at which its products may be resold once con-
1 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963).
17 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). The Court in
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. seems to foreclose General Motors from restricting its dealers
from transacting sales with discounters, as sought by the government, but not granted
by the Court in the General Motors Corp. case.
18 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1856 (1967). While the
Court did not consider whether a patentee has any greater rights, it suggested that
United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), be compared with United
States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); United States v. Line Material Co.,
333 U.S. 287 (1948); and United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). These
latter cases do not give much comfort to the patentee who wishes to impose area and
customer restrictions on a licensee. By directing attention to these cases, it appears
that the Court is saying that it is prepared to limit patentees the same as others.
1 887 Sup. Ct. at 1867.
20 Id. at 1870.
2 1 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 260 (1963); United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721, 723-24 (1944).
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trol over them is relinquished. Mr. Justice Stewart, quoting from
Mr. Justice Douglas' separate opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,22 foresees "suppliers [forced] to abandon franchising and inte-
grate forward to the detriment of small business" and that "the small
independent businessman will be supplanted by clerks."' ' While
independent service station operators may not be much more than
clerks today, the Standard Oil Co. case has not led to forward
integration by the oil industry, as predicted by Mr. Justice Douglas.24
Other types of independent businesses operating in the vast distri-
bution industry may also be able to survive Schwinn. The agency
and consignment method of distribution which was the heart of
Schwinn's marketing system (accounting for 75% of the distribution
of Schwinn's products) was held valid by the Supreme Court.25 Also,
the Court pointed out that: "a manufacturer of a product, other and
equivalent brands of which are readily available in the market, may
select his customers, and for this purpose he may 'franchise' certain
dealers to whom, alone, he will sell his goods."26 Although many
manufacturers may turn to the agency and consignment marketing
system, hundreds of manufacturers have for years been successfully
operating under antitrust decrees forbidding precisely the same type
of product control held per se illegal in Arnold, Schwinn & Co.
Injunctive provisions of this type have long been standard in De-
partment of Justice consent and litigated decrees.
As previously noted the Court upheld the validity of the heart
of Schwinn's distribution system-the consignment, agency or so-
called "Schwinn-Plan"-representing 75% of the products it dis-
tributed. The Court said that after looking at the market as a whole,
it could not "conclude that Schwinn's franchising of retailers and
its confinement of retail sales to them-so long as it retains all indicia
of ownership, including title, dominion, and risk, and so long as the
dealings in question are indistinguishable in function from agents
or salesmen-constitute an 'unreasonable' restraint of trade."2 7 The
22 337 U.S. 293, 321 (1949).
23 87 Sup. Ct. at 1870.
24The Federal Trade Commission Report on Anticompetitive Practices In The
Marketing of Gasoline, ATRR No. 312, July 4, 1967.
2187 Sup. Ct. at 1866.
20 Id. at 1864.
27Id. at 1866. The Court said it deemed critical the following facts: (1) the
availabiilty of other competitive bicycles to distributors and retailers which are reason-
ably interchangeable with Schwinn products; (2) that Schwinn distributors and retailers
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Court explained that it was rejecting a per se rule approach to the
consignment or agency system of distribution because such a "rule
might severely hamper smaller enterprises resorting to reasonable
methods of meeting the competition of giants and of merchandising
through independent dealers, and it might sharply accelerate the
trend towards vertical integration of the distribution process." 28
But the Court went on to warn that "to allow this freedom [to restrict
the dealers] where the manufacturer has parted with dominion over
the goods-the usual market situation-would violate the ancient
rule against restraints on alienation and open the door to exclusivity
of outlets and limitation of territory further than prudence per-
mits."29
The justifications advanced for the restrictions upheld in Arnold,
Schwinn & Co. fall short of those suggested in White Motor Co.80
Schwinn was not a failing company. It was not a small company
trying to break into or stay in a market nor a company marketing a
new and risky product. Instead, it was the nation's leading bicycle
producer. What appears to have moved the Court is the fact that
Schwinn and other domestic bicycle manufacturers were competing
against so-called mass merchandisers. The Court apparently believed
that Schwinn's distribution restrictions were necessary to protect it
against these large aggressive competitors.81
Thus, Arnold, Schwinn & Co. seems to leave open the right of
some manufacturers to impose some restrictions on the resale of their
products, provided that they can show a business necessity to compete
with larger competitors; that an agency or consignment plan is
utilized so that dominion is retained over the products; and that
the scheme is not part of a plan to fix, maintain or stabilize resale
prices. However, these limitations create a narrow path for those
who desire to impose resale restrictions on their dealers even under
handle other brands of bicydes as well as Schwinn's; (8) the vertical restraints at
time of decision were not intermixed with price fixing; and (4) the findings of the
trial court that competition made necessary the challenged program; and that its net
effect is to preserve and not to damage competition in the bicycle market. Id. at 1866-
67. The District Court had found that Schwinn adopted its agency or consignment plan
in-a competitive situation dominated by mass merchandisers such as Sears which
had access to large scale advertising and promotion, choice retail outlets both owned
and franchised, and adequate sources of supply. Id. at 1860.
2 Id. at 1866.
209 Ibid.
30 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
81 See 87 Sup. Ct. at 1864.
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a consignment or agency arrangement. And, of course, if the
territorial or dealer restrictions are accompanied by price fixing the
result would be a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
3 2
SEALY, INC.
The government prevailed in Sealy, Inc. 33 but as in Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.34 it did not get the ruling it was seeking. Instead of
creating new law, Sealy, Inc. casts a degree of doubt on what had
heretofore seemed to be a clear principle of antitrust law-that hori-
zontal territorial allocations are illegal per se under the Sherman Act.
Sealy, Inc., is owned and controlled by approximately 30 bedding
manufacturers, each of which is licensed by Sealy to manufacture and
sell bedding under Sealy's trademarks in mutually exclusive terri-
tories. The issue presented to the Court was whether this alloca-
tion of territories among the manufacturers violates section 1 of the
Sherman Act.3 5 The government, relying on White Motor Co.
3 6
and a long line of cases, contended that the arrangement was a
horizontal case where competitors had agreed to divide markets-a
per se violation of the Sherman Act.37 The Supreme Court agreed
that the "territorial arrangements must be regarded as the creature
of horizontal action by the licensees," viewing Sealy, Inc. as "an in-
strumentality of the licensees for purposes of the horizontal terri-
torial allocation."38  However, the Court did not condemn the
arrangements as per se violative of the Sherman Act. Instead, it
looked back to the fact that the arrangements for territorial limita-
tions were part of a price-fixing scheme (which had been enjoined by
the District Court and not appealed from) and condemned the
arrangements as part of "'an aggregation of trade restraints' in-
cluding unlawful price fixing and policing .... Within settled doc-
trine, they are unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act without the
necessity for an inquiry in each particular case as to their business or
32 Id. at 1862; United States v. Sealey, Inc., 87 Sup. Ct. 1847 (1967); Simpson v. Union
Oil Co., 877 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707
(1944).
3 United States v. Sealy, Inc., supra note 32.
"United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1856 (1967).
"r 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
86 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
'T Brief for the United States, pp. 7-8, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 87 Sup. Ct.
1847 (1967).
"1 87 Sup. Ct. at 1851.
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economic justification, their impact in the marketplace, or their
reasonableness."3 9
What is puzzling about Sealy, Inc. is why the Court did not
condemn the horizontal division of territories as illegal per se instead
of relying on price-fixing to find an "aggregation of trade restraints,"
of the type found unlawful in Timkin Roller Bearing Co.40 As
recently as White Motor Co.,41 the Court, although it refrained from
deciding whether a vertical arrangement by which a manufacturer
restricted the territory of his dealers was per se illegal, flatly stated
that: "if competitors agree to divide markets, they run afoul of the
antitrust laws.' 42  In Northern Pac. Ry.,43 the Court had cited
"division of markets" as one of several practices that are illegal per
se. Furthermore, the Court in Sealy, Inc. seems to be saying what
it has asserted over and over again-when not actually necessary
to decide a case-that market division among competitors is illegal
per se. Thus, in a footnote the Court quotes from Mr. Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in General Motors Corp.44 that: "'Al-
though Parke Davis related to alleged price-fixing, I have been un-
able to discern any tenable reason for differentiating it from a case
involving, as here, alleged boycotting.' "45 Then adds the Court:
"'The same conclusion would seem to apply with respect to an
alleged market division, which, like price-fixing, group boycotts, and
tying arrangements, has been held to be a per se violation of the
Sherman Act .... ' -46
The only clue for the failure of the Court to apply a per se rule
to a pure horizontal market division case is the argument of reason-
ableness. It was suggested to the Court that a number of small
grocers might allocate territory among themselves on an exclusive
basis as incident to the use of a common name and common adver-
tisements, and that this type of an arrangement would be in the
"OId. at 1852-53.
do Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
"'White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
42 Id. at 259.
"In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), the Court said:
... there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be un-
reasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use."
,"United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 148-49 (1966).
4" 87 Sup. Ct. at 1852-53 n.5.
40 Ibid.
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interest of competition. Although the Court replied that it would
leave this question open for decision if and when presented,47 it
proceeds in a footnote to compare this type of situation to the
reasonable tie-in circumstances in Northern Pac. Ry.: "As a simple
example, if one of a dozen food stores in a community were to refuse
to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar, it would hardly tend
to restrain competition in sugar if its competitors were ready and
able to sell flour by itself."' 48 Thus, the Court seems to be saying
that there may be some market division situations less restrictive than
in Sealy, Inc. that are not per se illegal; but it will tax the in-
genuity of lawyers and businessmen to come up with a market alloca-
tion plan that will be reasonable. A division of markets creates a
greater restraint on competition than does price-fixing, which is with-
out question unlawful per se. While price-fixing eliminates one
form of competition, an agreement of competitors to divide markets
eliminates all competition between them.
CONCLUSION
Beginning with White Motor Co.49 and continuing with General
Motors Corp.,50 the government sought a rule of law which would
prevent a manufacturer from limiting the area and the persons to
whom its dealers could resell its products. The Court declined in
both cases to hold such vertical restraint unlawful per se. In White
Motor Co. it declined on the ground that it wanted to know more
of the reasons for such restrictions than were available on a summary
judgment record. In General Motors Corp. the government sought
a ruling forbidding General Motors from unilaterally preventing its
dealers from selling cars through discount houses, but the Court
decided the case as "a classic conspiracy" between General Motors
and its dealers to eliminate the discounters' market access.
In Arnold, Schwinn & Co.51 the government abandoned its per
se approach and urged the Court to hold that it was an unreason-
able restraint of trade for Schwinn to unilaterally require its dealers
to limit the area or persons to whom they could resell Schwinn
products. Instead of so holding, the Supreme Court for the first time
17 Id. at 1852.
18 Id. at 1852 n.4.
"1 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
rO United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
'l United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1856 (1967).
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adopted a per se approach and outlawed such activity where the
manufacturer has parted with dominion over its products. However,
even though Schwinn used the consignment or agency method for
distribution of over 75% of its products, the Court held that this
technique of distribution control was reasonable, apparently because
it was convinced that the company needed to exercise such controls
in order to compete with mass merchandisers. Nevertheless, the
holding appears to be a narrow one that can be readily distinguished
on the facts.
The Court also had an opportunity in Sealy., InCY2 to apply a per
se approach to a horizontal restrictive distribution system. Yet, it
refused to do so relying instead on established law that an "aggrega-
tion of trade restraints" that includes price-fixing violates the Sher-
man Act. In order to take this approach the Court had to look at
the case as originally tried, since the price-fixing activities had been
held to be illegal at trial and no appeal had been taken from that
holding.53
Thus, after four distribution cases have been decided by the
Supreme Court, new law has been established only with respect to
vertical arrangements where dominion has passed. The Court's
reasons for refusing to state flatly what it has long said in dictum-
that territorial allocations between competitors are illegal per se-
are puzzling indeed. Nevertheless, the degree to which even small
companies can utilize a consignment or agency plan to restrict the
retail distribution of their products or join with competitors to limit
the areas in which or the persons to whom products may be resold,
appears to be small and subject to a heavy burden of economic
justification.
52 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 87 Sup. Ct. 1847 (1967).
us Id. at 1849.
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